11 May 2008

Ἀναστάσις—The Rebirth of the Nicene Faith

Jason G. Andersen

After the Council of Nicea in 325, there was much turmoil within the empire in regard to doctrine. Arianism was not completely vanquished until the effects of the Council of Constantinople of 381 became firmly established and after the appointment of a non-Arian Bishop. Between the councils, Julian strove to bring back pagan practices, and Valens fought against the orthodox faith. For example, he divided Basil’s civil province to discipline his stubborn orthodoxy thereby lessening his power, but in turn, Basil appointed his friend, Gregory Nazianzus and brother, Gregory of Nyssa in the newly established sees.

Valens, however, did not last much longer. In 378, he died in battle against the revolting Visigoths. In his place, Emperor Gratian of the western empire appointed Theodosius, a Spaniard. According to both Socrates and Sozomen, he was a capable man and general in the eyes of the people before his appointment.[1] Theodosius swiftly went to work to quell the uprising. “Theodosius was. . . successful against the tribes from the bank of Ister; he defeated them compelling them to sue for peace and, after accepting hostages from them proceeded to Thessalonica.”[2] At this point, Theodosius became deadly ill and “was most gladly baptized by the bishop” because he held to Nicene doctrine. Sozomen tells us that Theodosius grew up with parents who held to Nicene doctrine and this devotion was passed on to him. He heard from the bishop at Thessalonica that further east, especially at Constantinople, there were many divisions among the Church concerning trinitarian doctrine.[3]

Soon after Theodosius’ baptism, Gregory Nazianzus was called upon to revive Nicene faith within the Arian walls of Constantinople. He began to preach Nicene orthodoxy from a small home which was converted into a chapel. It was named ἀναστάσις-resurrection-because his preaching heralded a new call for Nicene orthodoxy to be resurrected in opposition to the Arian faith so deeply entrenched at Constantinople. He preached a series of great sermons on the Trinity which proclaimed essential Nicene truths. Sozomen speaks concerning this saying, “The name Anastasis was given to this church, because, as I believe, the Nicene doctrines which were fallen into disuse in Constantinople, and, so to speak, buried by reason of power of the heterodox, arose from the dead and were again quickened through the discourses of Gregory.”[4]

In 380, Theodosius condemned Arians and called the eastern church back to the faith of Peter, the Roman Church, and bishop Peter of Alexandria (Anthanasius’ brother).[5] He removed the Bishop of Constantinople, Demophilus, from his see and appointed Gregory Nazianzus. Gregory’s appointment as bishop of Constanitinople was met with controversy later on at the coming council, especially by the Alexandrian bishops because he already held the see at Nazianzus. Hearing this, Gregory stepped down not only from his see in Constantinople but also from being the president over the council. Sozomen praises Gregory for his humility in this situation.[6] In place of Gregory, Sozomen and Socrates tell us that Emperor Theodosius appointed an elderly man as bishop, “mild and gentle in his manners, and admirable in his whole course of life.”[7] He was a prætor of the senatorial class and was appointed at the suggestion of Diodorus, Bishop of Tarsus. He was appointed even after it was found out that he was not baptized. Sozomen praises his appointment as being brought about “by divine strength.”[8] Theodosius continued his push for Nicene orthodoxy by forbidding the assembling of non-orthodox groups and taking the churches from the Arians in Constantinople. He called a council of eastern bishops to reassert the orthodox faith. The council convened in May of 381 with 150 bishops attending.

The Council and Its Canons

This council was not immediately considered to be of any prominence until the Council of Chalcedon of 451. There were four canons of the council with an additional two canons which were not part of the proceedings of the council. According to Leo Donald Davis, the 5th and 6th canons came from the local council of Constantinople of 382.[9]

The first canon reasserted the Nicene faith saying, “the faith of the 318 fathers who assembled at Nicea in Bithynia is not to be made void, but shall continue to be established.”[10] Among the anathemas of the first canon are the Eunomians, Arians, Sabellians, Marcellians, Photinians, and the Apollinarians.[11] Every one of these heresies were heretical in that they denied part of the orthodox teaching on the trinity. The second canon said that bishops were not to meddle in business outside of their particular region. Davis says that this principle later develops into the principle of accommodation in the eastern church where “the importance of an episcopal see depends on its prominence in civil matters.”[12] For example, the bishop of Alexandria was to use his power only within the area of Alexandria and Egypt. He was not allowed to use his ecclesiastical authority if he were in Antioch unless he was asked to do so by the local bishop. In addition to this, the third canon said, “The bishop of Constantinople should have the next prerogative of honor after the bishop of Rome, because that city was New Rome.”[13] Davis notes how this point has caused tension throughout the Church for “centuries to come.”[14] The final canon denied the appointment of Maximus the Cynic as bishop of Constantinople, nullifying all his ordinations and official acts. Davis summarizes the accomplishments of the canon and says,

Theologically, it had carried on the logic of the Council of Nicea and cautiously applied the Council’s reasoning about the Son’s relation to the Father to the Holy Spirit, though confining its statement to biblical terminology. Administratively, the council continued the eastern practice of accommodating the ecclesiastical organization to the civil organization of the Empire, sowing the seeds of discord among the four great sees of the East and West by the raising the ecclesiastical status of Constantinople to correspond to its civil position as New Rome.[15]

The Creed Traditionally Ascribed to the First Council of Constantinople

We believe in one God, the Father, almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible;

And in the one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten from the Father before all ages, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not made, of one substance with the father, through Whom all things came into existence, Who because of us men and because of our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and became man, and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried, and rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures and ascended to heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father, and will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead, of Whose kingdom there will be no end;

And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, Who proceeds from the father [and the son], Who with the Father and the son is together worshiped and together glorified, Who spoke through the prophets; in one holy Catholic and apostolic Church. We confess one baptism to the remission of sins; we look forward to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. Amen.[16]

This creed is the creed that is accepted by the whole of Christendom as the Nicene Creed, however, this specific rendering is typically ascribed to the Council of Constantinople. According to popular thought, the creed originated at Nicea in 325 and was revised at Constantinople in 381. However, J.N.D. Kelly notes the creed ascribed to Nicea and the creed ascribed to Constantinople are wholly separate creeds.[17] Kelly compares the two creeds by providing the omissions from the Nicene Creed in the Creed of Constantinople and then also provides the additional material not found in the Creed.[18] In addition to these differences, when the creed was read aloud at the Council of Chalcedon, it seems that the fathers were unfamiliar with it whereas at the reading of the true Nicean creed brought a raucous applause.[19] This shows a discontinuity that is hard to reconcile if they were the same document.

Kelly goes on to suggest that the Creed of Constantinople was probably a local baptismal creed from the east which was drawn up during the council and accepted as authoritative at the Council of Chalcedon.[20] The problem that arises from the confusion is that the creed is certainly not the Nicene Creed, but the fathers of Constantinople did not want to replace the venerated Nicene Creed. For Kelly, the Creed of Constantinople is a reassertion of the Nicene Creed “in the shape of the Creed of Constantinople.”[21] It may not be the Nicene Creed, but its theological implications surely do not disagree with it.

The council of Constantinople is an important turning point in the Church where Arianism was finally vanquished and Nicene orthodoxy was upheld. To the chagrin of many today, there is not the sense of urgency of the Church being lost as there was at this time. There are many lessons to be learned by this period of history.

Bibliography

Davis, Leo Donald. The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology. Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1983.

Kelly, J.N.D., Early Christian Creeds. New York: Longman, 1972.

Schaff, Philip and Henry Wace. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Volume II, Socrates and Sozomenus: Church Histories. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952.

Cairns, Earle E. Christianity Through the Centuries: A History of the Christian Church. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996.



[1] Sozomen VII. 4, Socrates V. 2, Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Volume II, Socrates and Sozomenus: Church Histories (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1952) 119, 378.

[2] Sozomen VII. 4, Ibid., 378

[3] Sozomen VII. 4, Schaff, 378.

[4] Sozomen VII. 5, Schaff, 379.

[5] Leo Donald Davis, The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1983), 119.

[6] Sozomen VII. 6, Schaff, 380.

[7] Socrates V. 8, Schaff, 121.

[8] Sozomen VII. 8, Schaff, 381.

[9] Davis, 126.

[10]Ibid., 126.

[11] Ibid., 126, 7.

[12] Ibid., 127.

[13] Socrates V. 8, Schaff, 121.

[14] Davis, 128; See also Earle E. Cairns. Christianity Through the Centuries: A History of the Christian Church. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996) 151.

[15] Ibid., 129.

[16] J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (New York: Longman, 1972), 297, 98.

[17] Ibid., 296 ff.

[18] Ibid., 302, 303.

[19] Ibid., 316.

[20] Ibid., 296 ff.

[21] Davis, 123.

Control and Openness in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa

Jason G. Andersen

I. Historical Background

“One of the glories of history is that sometimes the wisdom of the past becomes a vitalizing fact for the future.”[1] Gregory of Nyssa was not only one of the great Church fathers of his time, for he was called “the Father of Fathers” by a later church council, but his life and work can help us to work through the divisiveness within the church and theology right now. Gregory was born around 335 A.D. to Godly parents, grandparents and siblings. Two of the greatest influences in his life were his brother Basil and his sister Macrina the Younger. Basil, the father of the Monastic movement in the east, was educated classically in Athens, and it is assumed by most scholars that this is where Gregory learned most of his non-biblical training. Gregory differentiates himself from his brother Basil, however, in his attitude towards non-Christian ideas. Paulos Mar Gregorios says that Gregory used pagan philosophies in order to fight them especially during the reign of Julian the Apostate who recalled pagan religion over and against Christianity.[2] His chaste sister rebuked him for what she considered his love of pagan philosophy, but Gregorios later explains Gregory’s use of non-biblical knowledge:

Gregory exemplifies a positive attitude to the material creation as such, and not merely to pagan philosophy. The mistrust of pagan knowledge, art and culture, of beauty and pleasure, which characterized certain aspects of the early Latin tradition are not seen here. It is a fact that the better values in pagan culture were more freely appreciated and faithfully conserved by Gregory than they were by contemporary pagans, who under the influence of Neoplatonism and Manicheeism despised the aesthetic values of this world.[3]

Gregory was also influenced by Origen’s teaching’s through Gregory Thaumaturgus who had been heavily influenced by Origen and had brought his teachings to Pontus. Initially as you read Gregory, he seems to be completely Origenist in that he uses allegorical interpretation. However, Gregory did not wholly accept Origenist teachings because he based his study on the Bible and not on any one man.[4]

II. Methodology

A. Theological Method and Presuppositions

Gregory’s basis for his theology is an understanding that “all scripture [is] inspired by God, all must be useful and must contain truth – even if that truth is hard to access.”[5] He continues his description of the truth of scripture by rejecting the truth if it is a “theological impropriety, a physical or logical impossibility, [or] useless or immoral” and says that “these impossibilities point towards a spiritual meaning of scripture.”[6] Gregory was drawn to use allegory to help interpret difficult passages. He inherited this understanding of a deeper meaning from Origen. Ludlow says that Gregory defends his use of allegory by citing Paul’s explicit use of allegory in Galatians as a defense for his use of it.[7]

Another aspect of Gregory’s method is his understanding of what theology is. To speak of Gregory’s theology would be to speak in a manner which was foreign to Gregory. One of Gregory’s fundamental presuppositions was that there can only be “one theology, common for us all, expressed in the divine words (theological statements: θεολογίαι) of the Hoy Scripture, set out for us by the persons inspired by the Holy Spirit.”[8] Theology is built on “many words but only one ‘speaking body’ of several members” based on the word of God.[9] Thus, acccording to Gregory, there is no specific theology of Basil or Gregory Nazianzus, but there is one theology based in scripture and communicated through a community in various forms. A certain man’s theology would simply be the work of man and not of God. Ari Ojell explains Gregory’s theology even further and says concerning Gregory, “Any identification of himself as a theologian, and claim ‘according to my theology’ with a reference to his personal speculations concerning God, would be the same as admitting that he is a heretic having his own private god, an idol that he has made up of his own theory.”[10] Gregory is making a point in his semantic game: we are not called to be theologians, but servants of the mysteries of God in line with Paul or Moses. According to Gregory, the utmost Christian perfection would not be a theologian but a servant of God whom the lord calls friend.[11]

Another theme that Gregory focuses on is that of akolouthia. For Gregory, akolouthia is the idea that there is a logical sequence and coherence throughout all of scripture at both the level of the text, the level of the underlying spiritual meaning of the text, and throughout all of creation.[12] The akolouthia or sequence is a distinction between the creation and the Creator, but akolouthia is also part of the mark of God in creation.[13] Gregory focuses on the creation and the eschatos because they are the beginnning and end of the sequence built into God’s creation.[14] Akolouthia does not, however, imply that Gregory belived in some sort of Deism. The akolouthia of Gregory may be something that is built into creation, but God is still in control “upholding the universe by the word of his power.”

Within this system, Gregory believed that man was created in the image of God, and the primary attributes that God gave to man were human freedom, reason, the mind, gift of words, and royalty.[15] “Man is crowned with power to rule over the animals; man is crowned with understanding to marvel at the universe; man is crowned with an inquisitive, adventurous spirit to seek knowledge.”[16]

Even though Gregory proposes a logical framework for the world, he does not put forward the idea that logic is able to answer every question. He realizes that there are unknowable things, such as the essence of God. Gregorios describes Gregory’s view this way, “Reason, in its speculative thrust, is free to go wherever it wants, whereas for the Christian, reason has to be controlled by the category of the Intent of Scripture. Gregory says that the pagan thinker can use reason to affirm what he wishes, while for Christians, ‘We make the Holy Scriptures the standard and rule of all teaching; we are bound, therefore, to have in view that and only that which is in harmony with the intention of Scripture.’”[17] For Gregory, “pagan philosophy can either be the handmaid of Christian teaching, or the occasion for idolatry in the Temple of God.”[18] Gregorios suggests that Gregory lived with scripture as the basis for theology and builds off of that foundation with pagan philosophies where applicable whereas one of Gregory’s opponents, Eunomius, began with pagan philosophy and sought to adapt it to Christianity.[19] In some ways, Gregory’s akolouthia is similar to what we study today as “Biblical Theology” and the theology of the canon.

Gregory also emphasized that created beings were unable to know God’s complete essence or nature.[20] “The eternity of God, as uncreated Being who does not, by consequence, give any support to our thought, makes him inaccessible to rational knowledge.”[21] Archbishop Basil Krivochine also says in the same vein that God’s wisdom and his will are one and the same. “What he wills is wise, and by the very act of God’s knowing and willing, everything recieves being.”[22]

In divine nature, power is concurrent with will, and the measure of the power of God is the will. But the will is wisdom. And the property of wisdom is not to be ignorant of how every single thing came to be. With the knowledge also springs up the power to achieve. So whatever is known also immediately has come to be, the power to work out beings being concurrent; to be known leads to being effected, nothing intervening between known and coming into existence, but immediately, without any interval the work becomes accomplished simultaneously with the will. Thus the will is effective power so that whenever beings are willed they also come into being; those which are concieved have the possibility and occasion for their existence in being willed. From God’s side all things in creation are to be understood together—the will, the wisdom, the effective power and the essence of existing beings.[23]

B. Gregory’s Interpretive Method

Gregory follows after Origen in his methodology for interpreting the Scripture. A primary difference between Origen’s allegorical interpretation and Gregory’s, however, is the manner in which they employ allegory. For Origen, the meaning of a difficult text is defined by other connected passages in scripture. In other words, Origen does not see each passage in its context, but he sees it in a systematic manner where he looks for other relevant passages without considering the specific akolouthia of the text. Gregory, on the other hand, begins looking at difficult passages first by looking at the shape of the text by exploring the akolouthia, or overarching theme, of the text.[24] After Gregory understands the akolouthia of the text, he is free to interpret the text in light of the akolouthia.[25] Much of the time Gregory perceives that the akolouthia of the text reveals a jouney of the soul, which is most often, to Gregory, somewhat explicit in the text itself.[26]

IV. Example of Gregory’s Method: On the Life of Moses

On the Life of Moses is one of Gregory’s allegorical works which exemplifies much of his theological underpinnings.[27] In his later life, Gregory was asked by a young friend to write a work about a virtuous life, and he thought that the life of Moses would be a beneficial example. Gregory chooses the story of Moses because he believes that all Scripture is useful for teaching. Gregory begins by telling the historical story of Moses. For Gregory, the sequence of events of Moses’ life represent an upright Christian life. At the end of his explanation of Moses’ historical life Gregory says, “We must adapt the life which we have called to mind [Moses] to the aim which we have proposed for our study [the virtuous life] so that we might gain some benefit for the virtuous life from the things mentioned.”[28] Heine says that Gregory “reimagine[s] the life of Moses to show its usefulness for the Christian life in his own time.”[29]

In Gregory’s reimagining of Moses’ life, he begins his interpretation by pointing out that it is impossible for anyone to imitate Moses’ life.[30] In Gregory’s method, this impossibility points to a spiritual meaning because of the non-existent simple meaning. He then follows his method by examining the shape of the text and by looking at the sequence or akolouthia of Moses’ life. Gregory finds through Moses’ life that the goal of a virtuous life is to be “called a servant of God.”[31] Moses’ life is not understood simply as a perfect life; he did not cross over into the promised land. For Gregory, this illustrates the point that life does not end at death, but it continues forever. “Moses reached his goal and yet he will never quite be there [in this life].”[32]

V. Critique of Gregory’s Method

Akolouthia is one of the primary theological underpinnings of Gregory’s method. Gregory’s understanding that there is a sequence and order in all creation and in scripture is one of the best aspects of his method which we can glean for our own method today. If we fail to see the overarching themes throughout scripture, our interpretation will be lacking. I was speaking with one of my professors, and he was making a similar point about how we should understand Galatians. He said that we should not base our contextualization of the text outside of the text either in its Second Temple background or in Luther’s Reformation cry against works righteousness. Rather, we need to base our understanding of Galatians on the basis of the message of Galatians by itself and within its place in the canon. In the words of Gregory, we ought to understand that there is an akolouthia throughout the book of Galatians and the rest of Scripture that will help us understand the text. In addition to the akolouthia of Scripture, according to Gregory, there is also an akolouthia, which runs throughout all of creation which was placed there by God at the founding of this world. Gregory would probably go so far as to say that we can understand the earth rationally because of this order. The breakdown in understanding comes when man tries to comprehend the essence of God.

A problem arises for protestants when we come to Gregory’s allegorical method. It is an interesting balance between openness and control, which is foreign to our western, mostly Latin-derived interpretations. However much allegory is derided by the majority of those who were born under protestantism, there is a distinction between what we call allegory and what Gregory called allegory, and this needs to be noted before condemning Gregory’s interpretation. Typically, protestants fear allegorical interpretation because it seems like any wind of doctrine could be formulated from it. Gregory, however, came to the text with some constraints that helped to provide at least some structure from which allegory, literal interpretation, or typological interpretations could be hung. In regard to allegorical interpretation, we should think about what it is that God is saying by the text. Is the historically-driven sensus plenior the only valid interpretation, or can we take the intent of the text to go beyond its sensus plenior as Paul did in Galatians? Can God speak through allegory insofar as it is a part of the akolouthia of the text? Gregory defends his use by alluding to Paul’s allegory in Galatians. This issue remains unresolved and poorly discussed among traditional protestants today because of the rightly perceived danger of allegory. Ronald Heine suggests that the allegorical interpretation of Gregory which was constrained by akolouthia is the same task that a preacher faces weekly. “The preacher. . . must not only understand the Biblical text and be faithful to it but also reimagine it in the contemporary world.”[33]

V. Final Notes on Gregory

Gregory did much work in his day to defend orthodoxy. He fought against pagan philosophies by using them but not accommodating to them. He developed an understanding of Scripture which is a central tenant in keeping the Bible relevant to our our day in his akolouthia. He called men of God to be humble and realize that there is only one theology, and that theology is based on the Bible and nothing else. Gregory of Nyssa developed a system of thought, which we today might be able to utilize in our interpretation of scripture that may help us to hold on to the reins of orthodoxy in an age where the Bible is no longer center.


Bibliography

Attrep, Abe. “From the Old to the New: Some of St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Teachings and the Modern Era.” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 42 (1997): 287-298.

Gregorios, Paulos Mar. Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence. New York: Pargon House, 1980.

Heine, Ronald E. Reading the Old Testament with the Ancient Church. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007.

Krivochine, Archbishop Basil. “Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, According to Gregory of Nyssa.” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 21 (1977): 76- 104.

Ludlow, Morwenna Ludlow. “Theology and Allegory: Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the Unity and Diversity of Scripture.” International Journal of Systematic Theology 4 (2002): 45-66.

Ojell, Ari. “Service or Mastery? ‘Theology’ in Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium.” In Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II: An English Version with Supporting Studies Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, edited by Lenka Karfíková, Scot Douglass and Johannes Zachhuber. 473-484. Leiden: Brill, 2007.



[1] Abe Attrep, “From the Old to the New: Some of St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Teachings and the Modern Era,” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 42 (1997): 287.

[2] Paulos Mar Gregorios, Cosmic Man: The Divine Presence, (New York: Pargon House, 1980), xxv.

[3] Ibid., 5.

[4] Origen believed in a type of universal salvation and the pre-existence of souls; See also Georges Barrois, “The Alleged Origenism of St. Gregory of Nyssa,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 30 (1986): 7-16.

[5] Morwenna Ludlow, “Theology and Allegory: Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the Unity and Diversity of Scripture,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 4 (2002): 53.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ari Ojell, “Service or Mastery? ‘Theology’ in Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium,” in Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II: An English Version with Supporting Studies Proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, ed Lenka Karfíková, Scot Douglass and Johannes Zachhuber (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 474.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., 475

[12] Ludlow, 53.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 54

[15] Attrep, 290.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Gregorios, 3.

[18] Ibid., 23.

[19] Ibid., 26, 27.

[20] Archbishop Basil Krivochine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, According to Gregory of Nyssa,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 21 (1977): 76.

[21] Ibid., 77.

[22] Ibid., 51

[23] Ibid., 50, 51.

[24] Ludlow, 55.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] This basic overview of On the Life of Moses is found in Ronald E. Heine, Reading the Old Testament with the Ancient Church, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 88ff, and a theological overview is best explained in Ludlow, 55, 56.

[28] Heine, 89.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ludlow, 55.

[31] Ibid., 56.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Heine, 94.

07 January 2008

The Theology of Original Sin Based on ΕΦ Ω and Romans 5.12

in the Light of Historical and Grammatical Research

Jason G. Andersen

Διὰ τοῦτο ὥσπερ δι’ ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον.

Propterea sicut per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit in quo omnes peccaverunt.

Therefore as through one man, sin entered the world and through sin, death also in this manner death spread unto all men ἐφ all sinned.

This verse is pivotal in understanding the doctrine of original sin. Over the centuries it has been understood in many different ways. The crux of the problem is the manner in which ἐφ is translated. Should we translate ἐφ as because along with nearly every modern translation? The understanding that ensues in our Bibles today is that we, collectively as Adam’s race, sinned concomitantly with Adam when he ate of the fruit in the garden. This paper grapples with the traditional, modern understanding of original sin by challenging the translation of ἐφ as because preferring the translation upon which [event]. This understanding will be defended by briefly surveying the different modern attempts to understand this difficult passage, by looking at how Augustine and the Greek fathers understood the passage, by looking at the occurences of πί followed by a dative relative pronoun in the Septuagint (LXX) and by trying to flesh out some of the theological implications of this translation.

Although most modern translations agree to translate ἐφ as because, it is far from certain that these translations portray Paul’s intention. In fact, many commentators note that this translation is improbable either because occurrences of ἐφ understood causally in contemporary Greek literature are sparse[1] or because the translation does not logically follow the preceding content.[2] Fitzmyer also ponders the question as to why Paul uses ἐφ when he could have succinctly written διότι.[3] This specific issue needs to be dealt with especially if the plainer meanings, which are most commonly attested, are passed over for an idiomatic meaning. Benedict Englezakis does not think ἐφ should be translated because in Romans 5.12 noting S. Lyonnet’s and Frederick Danker’s articles. However, he does not provide an alternative translation.[4] Danker prefers the translation in which [νόμος].[5] Thus, there are many different ways that Romans 5.12 has been translated and interpreted.

Much of this confusion can be traced back to the interpretations of the Church Fathers. Our understanding stems from Saint Augustine’s fourth century, Latin understanding, which has heavily influenced our modern concept of verse twelve. David Weaver says that Pelagius himself preferred the translation quia as opposed to in quo, which Augustine preferred.[6] Pelagius’ causal translation allowed for the understanding that denied any real inheritance from Adam but said that we sin only in the likeness of Adam. There is no sin or guilt that passed on through the generations. Augustine influenced us precisely because of his anti-Pelagian interpretation. He said that all men sinned in Adam: “in whom all sinned.” In other words, he understood this passage in a way that would have stood in strict contraposition to any sort of Pelagian understanding. The Pelagian understanding placed all culpability of sin on individual humans.[7] Pelagius’ understanding is difficult to resolve with the Adam-Christ comparison in the rest of chapter 5 where Adam’s act is said to affect the whole race in the same manner that Christ’s act can affect the human race.[8] Augustine, however, did not base his understanding on the Greek text; instead of using the original Greek, he read a Latin translation, which, as Philip Quinn notes, had translated φ as in quo.[9] Joseph Fitzmyer says that Augustine first thought that the antecedent was peccatum until he found out that μαρτία in Greek was feminine, at which point he considered the antecedent to be the far-fetched unus homo.[10] Many have noted that it is grammatically improbable that, in the Greek, εἷς ἄνθρωπος is the antecedent as Augustine understood it because if Paul wanted to say in, he would have used ἐν and not ἐπι.[11]

The most interesting thing to note about Augustine’s understanding is that he could not have understood death to be the antecedent of if he were simply to look at the Latin Bible. Augustine could not have understood mors [death] as the antecedent because in Latin, it is feminine, but the relative pronoun quo refers to either a masculine or neuter antecedent. This does not mean that death has to be the antecedent, but Augustine apparently needed a specific antecedent, and he found it in unus homo [one man]. Thus, he eventually settled on unus homo as the antecedent. Unus homo can be grammatically tied to in quo so Augustine answered the problem of not having a clear antecedent. Therefore, Augustine’s understanding is in that one man (Adam), all men sinned. Augustine’s understanding has greatly influenced Christian thought about this passage and original sin by making us think that the result of Adam’s one sin was that we all sinned with the result that all died so that it is commonly translated as death spread unto all men because [or Augustine’s understanding in whom (Adam)] all sinned.

Weaver wrote a comprehensive study of the understanding of Romans 5.12 among the Greek fathers. In summary of his nearly 80 pages of research, the Greek fathers had differences with the Augustinian interpretation of Romans 5.12. Much has to do with how Adam, sin, death, and humanity are interrelated. He lists two main ideas present in the Greek fathers: First, humanity inherited a doctrine of passions, which is the immediate doctrine of sinful behavior, and second, there is an explicit rejection of an inheritance of guilt.[12] This is in contraposition to the Augustinian, Latin interpretations, which have influenced the majority of western Christianity who have traditionally had some understanding of an inheritance of guilt from Adam. Along with these premises, Weaver notes that some of the Greek authors “write of death as if it were the cause of sin.”[13] This also is in strict contraposition to Augustine’s view that we all sinned in or because of Adam and therefore fell into death. Weaver says of Athanasius, “There is an inheritance of corruption and death and moral debilitation stemming from Adam’s sin but no doctrine of original sin.”[14]

There are several alternatives to the modern translation of because. Fitzmyer notes twelve different ways this phrase could be interpreted and translated. Some of the more prominent ones are the interpretations because of whom [antecedent Adam], in whom [antecedent Adam], on the grounds of which [antecedent death], or because [idiomatic], which would be synonymous with διότι.[15] The reading that best interprets Paul is a translation similar to upon which with being neuter referring to the event ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν. In Greek, unlike our English translations, ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν immediately precedes ἐφ. This proximity makes the translation with the antecedent being the event of the spreading of death more probable. This translation, as any other, ought to be based on a right understanding of scripture so as not to conform to some historical theology. The few hurdles that must be jumped over in order to understand this concept are worth the effort put into understanding them.

Fitzmyer notes the translation of upon which [death], although he quickly dismisses it as problematic; he says, “It seems to put the cart before the horse.”[16] Stanley Porter notes similarly that if θάνατος is the antecedent, the sentence isn’t only “redundant,” but “it seems to invert the order of events of sin and death. . . with sin coming in a mandatory two stage process, with sin coming on account of death and with death limited to a purely spiritual sense.”[17] Is it ok, in this instance, to put the cart before the horse? The translation we have provided would also seem to put the cart before the horse. In order to dispute these claims, it is necessary to understand the theology of sin and death within the context of Romans 5.12-21 and not only within the context of one’s systematic theology. First, this verse seems to be setting up the whole rest of the passage: a topic sentence of sorts. Διὰ τοῦτο links this passage back to the rest of chapter five. This is a transitional phrase but also a conjunction to tie what Paul has said—we have been reconciled to God through Christ—to what he will say—Adam’s act was efficacious in that all died in the same manner that Christ’s act is efficacious in that all are justified and made alive (5.18). Adam’s act brought death and Christ’s act brings life. Although this sequence of sin and death is in opposition to our traditional understanding, it can be understood with as few problems as our traditional understanding.

Schreiner concurs that 5.12d should not be translated as because but rather as on the basis of this death all sinned.[18] This understanding is neither widely accepted nor understood and is foreign to many people’s understanding of the inception of sin because of Augustine’s interpretation. Schreiner notes succinctly, “In other words, the result of spiritual death [which was a consequence of Adam’s one sin] is a lifestyle of sin.”[19] Schreiner understands that does not specifically refer to θάνατος rather ἐφ connects the two ideas.[20]

Concerning the sequence of sin and death in the verse, some have noted the grammatical structure as a way in which we can understand this sequence. Many consider this verse to be a chiasm[21] or even a complete ὥσπερ/οὕτως comparison.[22] The grammatical structure of the verse may (or may not) seem to support either understanding, but conceptually, there are problems. As Fitzmyer notes if ἐφ is taken to be because, which as Moo notes produces a chiasm,[23] it makes 12d “contradictory” to 12a-c. “At the beginning of v. 12 sin and death are ascribed to Adam; now death seems to be owing to human acts.”[24] If one is to understand ἐφ as a causal idiom, it is not consistent with the rest of the verse and paragraph, but if one is to understand ἐφ as upon which [event], it goes against the whole historical understanding of original sin.

In regard to the use of ἐφ as a causal idiom, it is possible that ἐφ never actually was used idiomatically at the time that Paul wrote the epistle. Photius of the ninth century is quoted as one of the earliest to have understood ἐφ causally, but he does not cite other extra-biblical examples.[25] Somehow over the course of history, it has become more accepted to translate ἐφ as because. It is interesting to see that Pelagius translated ἐφ causally.[26]

In order to understand ἐφ in this context, it is necessary to look at other local occurences of this phrase-specifically ἐφ and also all of the occurrences of πί followed by a dative relative pronoun in the LXX and the Greek New Testament. To our knowledge, no one has published any literature on ἐφ and the LXX. These results must be understood as supplemental to research that is already established about ἐφ because the majority of the LXX is a translation and was not originally composed in Greek. The information from the apocryphal books, such as 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Maccabees, may help solidify a Greek understanding of ἐφ if they were composed in Greek. Following is a list of Hebrew words and phrases that the LXX translates as πί followed by a dative relative pronoun derived from Emmanuel Tov’s parallel LXX and Hebrew Bible (MT).

אשר 6 times

Øעל + 1 time

על. . .אשר 6 times (על with or without a pronominal suffix)

אל בצעך 1 time

ב. . .אשר 4 times (ב with a pronominal suffix)

מבטחה 1 time (noun)

זה + לו 1 time (separated by יְהוָה קִוִּינוּ)

מבטחם 1 time (noun)

Lancelot Brenton translates all the occurrences of πί followed by a dative relative pronoun as for which, on which, on whom, whereby, wherein, etc.[27] In other words, he sees that each occurrence of this phrase always has an antecedent; it never is understood as a causal idiom. It seems that the LXX translators never thought that a Hebrew word indicating cause e.g. כי would best be translated as ἐφ. The phrases translated most often as πί followed by a dative relative pronoun from the Hebrew are the relative pronoun אשר with either על, ב. . ., or nothing. Of the apocryphal occurrences, none should be treated as a causal idiom, as nearly all of them refer to a specific antecedent. This group of examples supports Joseph Fitzmyer’s article in questioning whether or not the causal understanding of ἐφ exists outside of the New Testament. If, in fact, ἐφ does not occur as a causal idiom outside of the New Testament, its use in the New Testament as a causal idiom must be questioned verse by verse.

The complete chart of occurrences of πί followed by a dative relative pronoun in the LXX also lists all of the New Testament occurrences with the KJV translation. It is interesting to note that none of the KJV translations translate it as because. All of them translate the prepositional phrase as a prepositional phrase. So, either we know something that the King James translators did not know, or between the course of then and now, we have invented a new meaning. Perhaps someone read Photius’ statement that ἐφ in Romans 5.12 was taken “manifestly” in a causal sense[28] and therefore accepted the causal sense as a fact before seeing the absence of any occurrence in other Greek literature.

Being hesitant to translate ἐφ causally, what happens when we translate it upon which [event]? This translation does not make sense according to our systematic understanding of original sin partially because of Augustine’s understanding of the sequence of sin and death: Adam’s sin, everyone’s sin, and death. If ἐφ is understood as upon which [event], it shows not only that death is derived from sin—τὰ γὰρ ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος—but sin is also derived from death, which ultimately stems from Adam’s one sin. Perhaps Paul was thinking of God’s declaration to Adam if he were to eat from the tree: “You will surely die!” Genesis provides the first view of the consequences for Adam’s sin in chapter two when God says to Adam that if he eats the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he will surely die. So that it is seen that when δι ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν—that first occurrence of sin—אדם died. In other words, sin entered the world by means of the death that Adam passed on to his descendents. In fact, Paul may be saying אדם-mankind-died along with אדם-the man as a consequence for his trespass. To refine this thought, he did not die nine-hundred years later, but אדם died at the exact time when he first bit of the fruit. When Adam first bit the fruit declaring himself to be like God, he and his progeny with him died.

This understanding of death is contrary to the manner that we typically think because we consider ourselves alive until we stop moving. Since Adam died, his race died. This term “dead” is not simply the loss of a cognitive, physical, and spiritual ability. Within the context of the passage, death might also refer to a disposition to die. A child is disposed to die at his or her conception. This death is not simply spiritual; it is also physical, emotional, and psychological. A baby is dead physically because he or she is prone to death, and this death is caused by Adam’s one sin. A baby is dead spiritually in that he or she is prone to sin; in fact, the baby will sin. So in this sense, death does not refer to absence of movement, but it would mean an absence of life for which God had originally created it. When Adam was kicked out the Garden, which contained the tree of life, he was denied the opportunity for life. According to our interpretation of Paul, this absence of life is the result of Adam’s one sin. That baby is thus disposed to die and disposed to sin, and indeed, he or she dies and sins. Εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον. There is an absence of life in that newborn. Through Adam’s one sin all died, and because of this death, all sinned and are disposed to and prone to sin. This is a possible understanding of what follows logically when ἐφ is taken as we have suggested. Death spread to all men, upon which event all sinned. Because man is dead, he consequently sins. This is why Paul can say in Romans 3 that there is not a righteous one—not one. All have sinned, and this is because of their spiritual death.

Thus, ἐφ as translated upon which [event] in Romans 5.12 is a valid translation, and it ought to be dealt with seriously in scholarship. The phrase ought to be translated as upon which, with the event ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν as the antecedent. This possible understanding stems from a right understanding of the Bible and Romans and is not hindered by our understanding of the systematic category of original sin. If we continue to understand ἐφ causally, we will remain in Augustine’s Latin sequential misunderstanding, all the while being at a loss in understanding what Paul may actually be saying.

Works Cited

Brenton, Lancelot, C.L. The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1986.

Cranfield, C.E.B. “On Some of the Problems in the Interpretation of Romans 5.12.” Scottish Journal of Theology 22 (1969): 324-341.

Danker, F.W. “Romans V. 12. Sin Under Law.” New Testament Studies 14 (1968): 424-439.

Englezakis, Benedict. “Romans 5,12-15 and the Pauline Teaching on the Lord’s Death: Some Observations.” Biblica 58 (1977): 231-236.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. “The Consecutive Meaning of ΕΦ Ω in Romans 5.12.” New Testament Studies 39 (1993): 321-339.

Kirby, John T. “The Syntax of Romans 5.12: A Rhetorical Approach.” New Testament Studies 33 (1987): 283-286.

Moo, Douglas J. The Epistle to the Romans. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996.

Porter, Stanley E. “The Pauline Concept of Original Sin, in Light of Rabbinic Background.” Tyndale Bulletin 41 (1990): 3-30.

Quinn, Philip. “Disputing the Augustinian Legacy: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Romans 5:12-19.” In The Augustinian Tradition, edited by Gareth B. Matthews, 233-250. Berkeley: University of California, 1999.

Sanday, William, and Arthur C. Headlam. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1977.

Schreiner, Thomas R. Romans. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998.

Weaver, David. “The Exegesis of Romans 5:12 Among the Greek Fathers and Its Implications for the Doctrine of Original Sin: The 5th-12th Centuries, Part III.” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 29 (1985): 231-257.

Weaver, David. “From Paul to Augustine: Romans 5:12 in Early Christian Exegesis.” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 27 (1983): 187-206.



[1] Joseph Fitzmyer, “The Consecutive Meaning of ΕΦ Ω in Romans 5.12,” New Testament Studies 39 (1993): 326.

[2] Ibid., 327, 328.

[3] Ibid., 327.

[4] Benedict Englezakis, “Romans 5,12-15 and the Pauline Teaching on the Lord’s Death: Some Observations,” Biblica 58 (1977): 232.

[5] F. W. Danker, “Romans V. 12. Sin Under Law,” New Testament Studies 14 (1968): 439.

[6] David Weaver, “From Paul to Augustine: Romans 5:12 in Early Christian Exegesis,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 27 (1983): 203.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.; C.E.B. Cranfield, “On Some of the Problems in the Interpretation of Romans 5.12,” Scottish Journal of Theology 22 (1969): 335.

[9] Philip Quinn, “Disputing the Augustinian Legacy: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Romans 5:12-19,” in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Berkeley: University of California, 1999) 235.

[10] Fitzmyer, 322, 323.

[11] Fitzmyer, 323; William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1977), 133; Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 273-274.

[12] David Weaver, “The Exegesis of Romans 5:12 Among the Greek Fathers and Its Implications for the Doctrine of Original Sin: The 5th-12th Centuries, Part III,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 29 (1985): 251.

[13] Ibid., 252.

[14] Weaver, “Early Christian Exegesis,” 199.

[15] Fitzmyer, 322-326.

[16] Ibid., 324.

[17] Stanley E. Porter, “The Pauline Concept of Original Sin, in Light of Rabbinic Background,” Tyndale Bulletin 41 (1990): 23.

[18] Schreiner, 270.

[19] Ibid., 276.

[20] Ibid., 274.

[21] Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 321; Englezakis, 231, 232.

[22] John T. Kirby, “The Syntax of Romans 5.12: A Rhetorical Approach,” New Testament Studies 33 (1987): 284.

[23] Moo, 321

[24] Fitzmyer, 327, 328.

[25] Fitzmyer, 326; Weaver, “Greek Fathers, Part III,” 244-246.

[26] Weaver, “Early Christian Exegesis,” 203.

[27] Lancelot C. L. Brenton, The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1986).

[28] Weaver, “Greek Fathers, Part III,” 245.